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I. INTRODUCTION
Someone once observed that when you rob Peter to pay Paul, you
always can count on the support of Paul. That is what the takings
clause of the United States Constitution is all about-it is designed to
prevent the many Pauls of the world from using their political power
to take property from the Peters of the world. In fact, it is something
of a misnomer to refer to the clause as the "takings" clause of the fifth
amendment. We would be far more correct if we called it the "anti-
takings" clause.
The first purpose of this commentary is to discuss the takings
clause and its historical development in the Supreme Court of the
United States. Then, the commentary will focus on the 1987 takings
Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. This commentary is
based upon remarks delivered by the author on March 17, 1988, as a Brendan
Brown Lecture at The Catholic University of America School of Law. A short
summary of the lecture will be distributed by the Washington Legal Foundation
as part of its Legal Backgrounder series. The author wishes to acknowledge the
University of Nebraska College of Law for furnishing financial support in the
form of a Ross McCollum Summer Research Grant.
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cases in the Supreme Court, and discuss whether they have restored
some bite to the fifth amendment's protection of private property.
IL THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
Properly understood, the takings clause provides that the costs of
government activity should be borne proportionately by the public at
large, rather than disproportionately by an individual owner of private
property. Seen in this light, the purpose of the clause is to resolve
what, in my opinion, is the most important question of political organi-
zation-the relationship between the state, individuals, and private
property. The result is the triumph of individual autonomy over col-
lective authority, of enterprise and achievement over envy and resent-
ment,1  and of private property over confiscation. Thus, our
Constitution vindicates the ancient maxim that a man is the king of
his own castle or, to quote an old Irish proverb: "As long as I live I'll
spit in my own parlor."2
Before going on to analyze this topic, I propose that we all commit
what is considered .by many constitutional commentators to be a her-
esy. My proposal is that we read each of the twelve words in the tak-
ings clause of the fifth amendment: "nor shall private property be
1. '"ere are two fundamentally differing foundations on which systems of moral-
ity have traditionally been based. One is pride of achievement; the other is the
resentment felt against those who achieve by those who do not." R. SHEAFFER,
RESENTMENT AGAINST ACHIEVEMENT:. UNDERSTANDING THE ASSAULT UPON
ABILTY 7-8 (1988). When the morality of achievement forms the basis of society,
"civilizations flourish in commerce, in the arts, in science; they erect great monu-
ments and are remembered by future times as magnificent eras." However, when
the morality of resentment prevails, "civilizations decline and eventually perish."
Id. at 8. Although Sheaffer's book is a polemic, it is one that often will cause the
reader to think seriously about competing world views.
2. H.L. MENCKEN, A NEW DICIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 985 (1942). Seen in this light,
the takings clause serves as a constitutional constraint against rent-seeking be-
havior by political factions. See Brennan & Buchanan, Is Public Chwice Immoral?
The Case for the "Nobel" Lie, 74 VA. L. REV. 179, 188 (1988). The Federalist No.
10, written by James Madison, establishes that the Constitution was designed "to
break and control the violence of faction." THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77 (J.
Madison)(C. Rossiter ed. 1961). The tern "rent-seeking behavior" was intro-
duced to economics by Anne 0. Krueger. It refers to the efforts of individuals or
groups to use political power and influence to expropriate the wealth of other
groups or individuals. See TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY ix
(J. Buchanan, R. Tollison & G. Tullock eds. 1980). See also Epstein, Toward a
Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CH. L. REV. 703, 713 (1984). This, in
turn, frequently results in resources being employed by the owners of the
targeted wealth to avoid the proposed redistribution. It should be obvious that
both those expenditures are deadweight social losses "so that the outcome of the
process is necessarily a negative sum game--regardless of who wins the struggle."
Epstein, An Outline of Takings, 41 U. MIAmi L. REV. 3, 18 (1986). See also Tul-
lock, Rent Seeking as a Negative-Sum Game, in TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-
SEEKING SOCIETY 16-36 (J. Buchanan, R. Tollison & G. Tullock eds. 1980).
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taken for public use, without just compensation."3
Now analyze those twelve words, and consider their relationship to
any governmental activity that has an impact on private property.
The challenged governmental activity might involve anything from
the building of a new post office on Blackacre, to zoning laws, taxa-
tion, or even laws regulating how fast we may drive our automobiles.
As Professor Richard Epstein has observed, when we analyze the va-
lidity of governmental activity under the takings clause, we need to
focus on four fundamental questions:
1.) Does the governmental activity result in a taking of private
property?
2.) If so, is the taking of private property for a public use?
3.) If so, has the property owner received just compensation for
the property that has been taken? and
4.) If just compensation has not been paid, is there any govern-
mental power which justifies the uncompensated taking?4
Let me propose two hypothetical cases to set the stage for the
analysis.
First, consider the classic example of eminent domain, the physical
taking of private property for governmental occupation. I own Black-
acre and the state wishes to locate a new state office building thereon.
However, I am unwilling to sell Blackacre at this time, so the state
responds by exercising its power of eminent domain. The state con-
demns Blackacre, and pays me the fair value of the property. Unlike
private individuals, the state may use its monopoly of force to compel
the transfer of private property so long as it complies with the limita-
tions set forth in the takings clause.
When we apply the four-step model of the takings clause to this
transaction, we get clear answers.
Has there been a taking of private property? Clearly, yes. The
state has physically expropriated Blackacre, my private property.
Was Blackacre taken for public use? Again, clearly yes. The state
is using Blackacre as a governmental office building, clearly a public
use.
Have I been paid just compensation? On these facts, clearly yes. I
was paid the "fair value" of the property. There often will be ques-
tions in actual cases about what the property owner's damages are, but
for our purposes we accept the assertion that I have been paid the
appropriate amount.
Thus, the state has used its power to force a transfer of my private
property, but it has done so in compliance with the takings clause.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V.




The cost of land acquisition for this public enterprise has been borne
proportionately by the public at large out of the state's revenues,
rather than disproportionately by the private landowner.
Now consider a second hypothetical. A large eastern city decides to
adopt a program to preserve privately owned buildings and landmarks
of historical significance. Rather than purchase the buildings and
maintain them as historic sites for the public, the city decides to re-
quire private landowners to maintain the properties as historic
landmarks. Legislation is enacted that severely restricts the right of
landowners to develop and improve their property and that places an
affirmative obligation on them to maintain the exterior features of
their buildings in good repair. How does this ordinance look under the
four-step analysis?
Has there been a taking of private property? Unlike the first ex-
ample, title and possession have not been expropriated by the city.
However, the city has placed a severe burden on the right of landown-
ers to use, develop, and enjoy their private property. Defacto, the city
has substituted itself for the private landowner with respect to the
power to control how that private property is used. Surely the takings
clause, one of the great, elastic provisions of the Bill of Rights, is broad
enough to cover this thinly veiled confiscation of private property.
Is the taking for a public use? Certainly, the preservation of our
culture for posterity is clearly a public function.
Has just compensation been paid? No, clearly not on the facts as I
have stated them. The city has chosen to use its monopoly of force to
compel private landowners to maintain their properties as public
landmarks.
Since just compensation has not been paid, is there any govern-
mental power that justifies the uncompensated taking? Is the normal
use of private property for profit an illegal use of force or fraud sub-
ject to the police power of the state? Are private landowners under an
obligation to maintain their properties as public monuments? If so,
what is the source of this obligation and by what theory does it over-
ride the express constitutional protection of private property against
uncompensated takings?
Finally, notice that this legislation, if allowed to stand, results in
exactly the situation that the takings clause was designed to prevent.
The costs of this public program for historic preservation are being
borne disproportionately by the individual owners of the regulated
property rather than proportionately by the public at large. Everyone
in society benefits from this program, but only a few bear the costs.
How would the United States Supreme Court answer the issues
raised by our hypotheticals?
1988]
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III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court case law on the takings clause has been any-
thing but clear. This body of case law has been criticized, quite cor-
rectly in my opinion, as an incoherent, unprincipled, crazy quilt
pattern of ad hoc determinations.S Much of the confusion results from
the historical distinction drawn by the Court between physical takings
and regulatory takings. This confusion also results from the Court's
inability to distinguish between the separate issues of whether prop-
erty has been taken on the one hand, and whether just compensation
was required on the other hand.
Physical takings involve governmental activity amounting to a
physical invasion of all or part of privately held property.6 Here, the
Court applies what amounts to a per se rule that such activity consti-
tutes a compensable taking. For example, in Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp.,7 a New York statute required all landlords to
allow cable television facilities to be installed upon their rental
properties in exchange for a one time payment of one dollar.8 The
Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Marshall, held that
since the statute authorized a "permanent physical occupation" of pri-
vate property, it was caught by the takings clause and required pay-
ment of just compensation.9
Professor Tribe, as always, speaking from the mainstream of con-
stitutional opinion, criticized the Loretto decision in the following re-
strained and moderate manner: "This obsession with permanent
physical invasions of even the most de minimis variety borders on fe-
tishism."o Perhaps his point was that since fetishism was involved,
the case should have been decided under the unenumerated right of
privacy. Regardless, Loretto makes clear that most physical invasions
of private property trigger the takings clause and call for the payment
of just compensation.
Regulatory takings, however, have received only minimal-some
would say sub-minimal-scrutiny in the Supreme Court. Regulatory
takings involve the government's efforts to regulate the possession,
use, or disposition of private property.'1 This category of takings can
take many forms. Common examples of regulatory takings are com-
prehensive zoning regulations, use restrictions, lot size restrictions,
5. See Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why The Takings Issue Is Still A Muddle, 57 S.
CAL. L. REV. 561, 562 (1984); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 403 (3rd ed. 1986).
6. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 421.
9. Id. at 441.
10. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 603 (2d ed. 1988).
11. See R. EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 100-01.
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maximum height restrictions on improvements, rent control laws, and
minimum wage laws. Much of the current confusion surrounding the
status of regulatory takings dates back to Justice Holmes' famous
statement in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,12 that "while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will-
be recognized as a taking."13 Normally, whether a regulation goes
"too far" depends upon the extent of the diminution in value of the
property resulting from the regulation.14
As Professor Rose has pointed out in her recent article on Penn-
sylvania Coal, Justice Holmes' test raised more questions than it an-
swered. What does "too far" mean? Does a fifty percent diminution
in the value of the regulated property amount to a taking? How about
a seventy-five percent diminution? Is anything less than a total deval-
uation constitutionally permissible? Why isn't a taking of fifty per-
cent, or twenty-five percent, or of one percent a taking?15
The courts have struggled with these and other questions in the
sixty-some odd years that have passed since Pennsylvania Coal was
decided in 1922. The result has been an unprincipled, ad hoc approach
that has taken most of the bite out of the fifth amendment's protection
of private property against regulatory takings. Under this approach,
only the most extreme and totally arbitrary restrictions are captured
by the takings clause. As one of the leading texts on constitutional
law states:
So long as the zoning ordinance reasonably advances some arguable "police
power" interest and does not literally transfer an existing property interest of
the owner to the government or other parties, the zoning of property should
not require compensation. Although the justices may "balance" public and
private interests in these cases, it is assumed that the public interest will pre-
vail unless a property use regulation enriches the government or public by
regulations which terminate or eliminate the primary economic value of a
property interest.1 6
Imagine if the Court were this insensitive when interpreting other
provisions of the Bill of Rights. How far could government go in re-
12. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
13. Id. at 415.
14. Justice Holmes put it this way: "One fact for consideration in determining such
limits is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in
most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compen-
sation to sustain the act." Id. at 413.
15. See RosE, supra note 5, at 566.
16. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 5, at 405-06. For a recent criti-
cism of the two-tiered system of constitutional review, which affords much
greater protection for so-called individual liberties than for economic civil rights,
see Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 SUP. C. REV. 397. Profes-
sor Miller concludes that perhaps the time has come for the Supreme Court to
"re-examine the wisdom of 'see-no-evil, hear-no-evil' as the prevailing philosophy
in economic regulation cases." Id. at 428.
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stricting freedom of speech, freedom of the press, or privacy if the
Court applied a similar level of sub-minimal scrutiny in these areas?
Even a young child knows that there is no distinction in principle
between a physical taking and a regulatory taking. To my son, it
makes no difference whether I physically take away his playdough, or
merely forbid him to play with it. Either way, he has been deprived of
his property, and he knows it.
Suppose I tell him that he may use his playdough only to form
shapes that are aesthetically pleasing to me-I allow him to make
busts of Adam Smith and Ronald Reagan, but not of dinosaurs or Gar-
bage Pail Kids. Does this change the analysis of whether I have taken
his property? Not in principle, only in degree. There has still been a
taking, although my son's damages may be less than when the taking
is absolute.
The same is true concerning governmental regulation of private
property. Whether the restriction is small or large, it is a taking of
private property that is captured by the takings clause. The size of the
taking and the public purpose that animates the regulation go to the
public use, compensation, and justification issues which should be ad-
dressed separately. When property with a value of one dollar is taken
by governmental activity, the Constitution, as properly understood, re-
quires one dollar of compensation to be paid; or, in the alternative,
that the government justify its activity by demonstrating which com-
pelling state interest trumps the fundamental right to possession, use,
and disposition of private property.
If you are still unconvinced that there is no distinction in principle
between a physical taking and a regulatory taking, try the following
experiment. Ignore the regulation and develop your property. I guar-
antee you that it will not be long before the regulators use force to
interfere with your use of your property.
Before discussing the 1987 cases, I want to analyze one of the
landmark regulatory takings cases, Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. New York City.'7 The facts of Penn Central are remarkably similar
to our hypothetical dealing with the landmark preservation ordinance.
In 1965, New York City adopted the Landmarks Preservation Law
which was designed to protect and preserve historic landmarks and
neighborhoods from precipitate decisions to destroy them or to funda-
mentally alter their character.1 8 The law required an owner of a his-
toric building to maintain the exterior of the building in good repair,
and placed severe restrictions on the owner's right to alter the exte-
rior architectural features of the building or to construct any exterior
17. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
18. Id. at 109.
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improvement on the landmark site.19 To offset some of the burdens of
landmark designation, the law allowed an affected landowner to
transfer any unused development rights from landmark properties to
other nearby parcels.2 0
The Landmarks Preservation Commission refused to allow Penn
Central to erect a high rise office building above Grand Central Sta-
tion. The Commission justified its decision on aesthetic grounds, con-
cluding that Penn Central's plan to balance a fifty-five story office
building above Grand Central Station was "an aesthetic joke."21 The
Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, held that the landmark re-
strictions did not effect a taking of Penn Central's property for three
reasons:
1.) the law did not interfere with Penn Central's existing use of
the property as a railroad terminal;
2.) it allowed Penn Central to obtain a "reasonable return" on its
investment; and
3.) the transferable development rights helped mitigate the finan-
cial burdens imposed on Penn Central by the regulatory scheme.
22
With all due respect, the Court's analysis in Penn Central was seri-
ously flawed. Whether a taking had occurred should have been deter-
mined by looking at what was taken by government, not at what the
property owner was permitted to retain.23 The fact that Penn Central
was allowed to continue using its property as a profitable railroad ter-
minal establishes only that the taking was partial; it does not establish
that no taking occurred. Like my son in our hypothetical, Penn Cen-
tral's fundamental right to develop its property was restricted by a
rule requiring it to do so only in ways that are aesthetically pleasing to
the community. Finally, note that the transferable development
rights should have been relevant only to the issue of just compensa-
tion, not to the issue of whether a taking had occurred.
Professor Richard Epstein recently made another interesting point
concerning these transferable development rights. In his book on the
law of takings, he put it this way:
One peculiarity of Penn Central is that the air rights to be granted Penn Cen-
tral were over eight properties, including the Biltmore Hotel, the Waldorf-
Astoria, and the Yale Club, that Penn Central already owned. How, it must be
asked, is the city in a position to grant these rights to Penn Central as compen-
sation for its landmark preservation statute? To do this, the city must first
own the rights, which it acquired not by purchase from Penn Central, but by
19. Id. at 111-12.
20. Id. at 113-14.
21. Id. at 117-18.
22. Id. at 136-37.
23. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) which held. "It is the owner's
loss, not the taker's gain, which is the measure of the value of the property
taken." Id. at 261.
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zoning. The city's compensation for the loss of air rights thus came from its
prior uncompensated takings. It is as though A uses money stolen from B to
pay B for property purchased from him thereafter.
This difficulty could be avoided by granting Penn Central air rights over
structures it did not own, but only by substituting one embarrassment for an-
other. The city would still have to acquire air rights over these properties,
which it would do not by payment of compensation to their present owners,
but by zoning. Note the irony. If zoning is mere regulation, then how can the
state then convey air rights as compensation to Penn Central? To make TDRs
work, we need a theory by which the air rights taken by the state through
zoning become property only when they are conveyed by the state. The origi-
nal confiscation is transparent if the air rights zoned away are then resold for
cash, and the matter is not any better when these same air rights are used to
acquire other property.
2 4
IV. THE 1987 TAKINGS CASES
Nevertheless, Penn Central was still "good law" as the Supreme
Court, with a new Chief Justice, William Rehnquist, and a new Associ-
ate Justice, Antonin Scalia, geared up for its 1986-87 term. The year
1987 was a busy one for the takings clause in the Supreme Court. No
less than seven takings cases were decided during the term, including
at least four that may have a major impact on the status of personal
economic liberties under the Constitution.2 5
In the remainder of this commentary, I will give you a brief sketch
of what the Court held in those four cases, and then share some pre-
liminary observations on the future significance of those recent
developments.
A. Keystone
The first significant takings case to be decided in 1987 was Keystone
Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis.26 The facts of Keystone
were identical in all material respects with those of Pennsylvania
Coal. Remarkably, although the Keystone Court was careful to avoid
overruling Justice Holmes and his "too far" test in Pennsylvania Coal,
it reached an opposite conclusion, and held that a Pennsylvania stat-
ute which prohibited coal mining that caused subsidence damage to
certain buildings and dwellings did not constitute a taking of private
property.27
24. R. EPsTEIN, supra note 4, at 189-90.
25. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987); Bowen v. Gil-
hard, 107 S. Ct. 3008 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County
of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987); Hodel v. Irving, 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987); U.S.
v. Cherokee Nation, 107 S. Ct. 1487 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987); F.C.C. v. Florida Power Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1107
(1987).
26. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
27. Id. at 1251.
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To understand the holding in Keystone, it is necessary to know that
Pennsylvania recognizes three separate physical estates in real prop-
erty-the surface estate, the mineral estate, and the support estate.28
The owner of the surface estate, as you might expect, acquires the
right to possess and improve the surface of real property. The owner
of the mineral estate acquires the right to extract minerals from the
property. The owner of the support estate has the right to control the
removal or non-removal of the layer of coal and earth that supports
the surface. Thus, when the owner of the mineral estate also owns the
support estate, he has the right to extract coal without regard to
whether it causes subsidence damage to the surface estate or any im-
provements thereon.
Many years ago western Pennsylvania property owners severed
the mineral estates and the support estates from the surface estates of
much of the land in that region. The coal mining companies typically
acquired or retained both the mineral estate and the support estate.
Thus, coal mining companies owned the right not only to extract coal
deposits from the land, but additionally to do so without any liability
to the owners of the surface estates for damages resulting from
subsidence.29
In 1966, the Pennsylvania Legislature passed a statute, the Subsi-
dence Act, that prohibited mining that caused subsidence damage to
cemeteries, certain public buildings, and dwellings used for human
habitation.30 The petitioners in Keystone, coal mining companies that
owned both the mineral estates and the support estates in certain land
affected by the Subsidence Act, brought a civil rights action to enjoin
its enforcement. They claimed that the Act violated the takings clause
because it completely destroyed their support estates in land affected
by the Act, and required them to leave twenty-seven million tons of
coal in the ground to provide surface support.
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, upheld the Subsidence
Act against petitioners' takings claim. According to the majority in
Keystone, the Subsidence Act did not effect a taking because it sub-
stantially advanced a legitimate state interest, and did not make it
"impossible for petitioners to profitably engage in their business."31
Again, these observations of the Court go merely to the public use
and just compensation issues, not to the issue of whether a taking oc-
curred. The Subsidence Act confiscated the petitioners' support es-
tates, and compelled them to leave twenty-seven million tons of coal
in the ground to provide support to owners of the surface estates who
28. See id. at 1238.
29. Id. at 1238-39.
30. Id. at 1237.
31. Id. at 1242.
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had expressly bargained away all claims to such support. Surely, this
amounts to a taking of private property.
Remarkably, Justice Stevens brushed aside these arguments with a
mere stroke of his pen. Said he: "The 27 million tons of coal do not
constitute a separate segment of property for takings law purposes,"32
because the petitioners owned additional coal that was not restricted,
and because the petitioners had failed to prove that they had been de-
nied "economically viable use" of their coal mining operations.33
Justice Stevens' refusal to recognize the twenty-seven million tons
of coal as a separate segment of property for takings law purposes re-
minds me of the classic movie, "The Miracle on 34th Street," in which
the main character was in court, and had to prove he was Kriss Krin-
gle. Remember that one? Do you remember how he proved it? To
prove his case, someone arranged to have the post office deliver the
thousands of letters addressed to Kriss Kringle, or Santa Claus, to the
courthouse. Bag upon bag of letters were deposited on the judge's
bench, until he was practically buried under them. Wouldn't it be
great if the coal companies did the same thing to Justice Stevens. Just
imagine twenty-seven million tons of coal being dumped into his
chambers! Do you suppose he would still find it so easy to deny its
existence?
The Bill of Rights got off to a slow start in 1987 with the majority
opinion in Keystone. There was, however, a powerful dissent in the
case, authored by the Chief Justice, and joined by Justices Powell,
O'Connor, and Scalia. That dissent perhaps foretold of better days
ahead for free men and women.
In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist first chided the majority for
refusing to apply Pennsylvania Coal to the nearly identical facts of
Keystone.3 4 He then reached the merits, criticized the majority's dis-
tinction between "regulatory" takings and physical takings,3 5 and con-
cluded that the Subsidence Act constituted an unconstitutional taking
of petitioners' property without just compensation. The Chief Justice
summed up his views as follows: "Specifically, the Act works to extin-
guish petitioners' interest in at least 27 million tons of coal by requir-
ing that coal to be left in the ground, and destroys their purchased
support estates."3 6 This realistic approach to the takings clause was
the minority position in Keystone. However, its logic and consistency
would soon attract a somewhat reluctant majority.
32. Id. at 1249.
33. Id.
34. "Examination of the relevant factors presented here convinces me that the differ-
ences between them and those in Pennsylvania Coal verge on the trivial." Id. at
1254 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 1258.




Hodel v. Irving,37 a regulatory takings case decided just two
months after Keystone, can be read either as breaking new ground in
the law of the takings clause, or as a classic example of results-ori-
ented jurisprudence. Take your pick. As for me, I read it as a signifi-
cant step toward personal economic liberty.
Hodel concerned an Act of Congress designed to ameliorate the
problem of fragmented ownership of Indian lands held in trust by the
United States.38 As Indian lands passed from generation to genera-
tion, they became splintered, and some parcels literally had hundreds
of owners, each with a tiny fractional share.3 9 Thus, Congress acted to
prohibit the passing on at death of small, undivided interests in Indian
lands with the goal of helping future generations of Indians make
more productive use of their ancestral lands.40 The Indian Land Con-
solidation Act of 1983 provided that no undivided fractional interest in
any tract of Indian land should descend by intestacy or devise, but in-
stead should escheat to the tribe "if such interest represent[ed] 2 per
centum or less of the total acreage in such tract and [had] earned to its
owner less than $100 in the preceding year."41
Note the very limited scope of the Act. It applied only to small,
fractional interests in land, it did not interfere with an owner's benefi-
cial enjoyment of the property during his lifetime, nor did it interfere
with an owner's right to transfer the property inter vivos.42 The Act
merely deprived an owner of the right to transfer a small fractional
interest in property, upon death, to his heirs or devisees. It was only a
partial interference with the right of disposition. Surely, in light of
the recent decision in Keystone, a consistent approach to the takings
clause would appear to call for a conclusion that the Act did not effect
a taking of private property.43
However, the Supreme Court invalidated the escheat provision as
an uncompensated taking. Even more remarkable is the sudden con-
version of Justice Stevens to the cause of economic civil liberties. Re-
member that just two months' earlier, in Keystone, Justice Stevens
refused to recognize that twenty-seven million tons of coal constituted
a protected segment of property under the takings clause. In Hodel,
37. 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987).
38. Id. at 2079.
39. Id. For example, one tract of Indian land contains 40 acres and produces $1,080 in
annual income. It is valued at $8,000. It has 439 owners, one-third of whom re-
ceive less than five cents and two-thirds of whom receive less than one dollar in
annual rent. Id. at 2081.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 2079.
42. See id. at 2082.
43. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (statute prohibiting disposition of eagle
feathers, not a taking).
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however, he made a U-turn, and suddenly discovered that "[t]he Fifth
Amendment draws no distinction between grand larceny and petty
larceny."44 Justice Stevens' statement echoes my own view of the tak-
ing clause. Small or large, complete or partial, long or short, shallow
or deep, a taking is a taking.
I want to make one more point concerning Justice Stevens' concur-
rence in Hodel, because I don't want to leave you with the wrong im-
pression. Clearly, he concurred in the judgment of the Court, but he
did so on due process grounds, rather than under the takings clause.
He concluded that the escheat provision violated the due process
clause of the fifth amendment because it did not give the affected land
owners a fair opportunity to consolidate their holdings by voluntary
transfers in order to avoid its application. However, in most instances,
regulations affecting property rights do not provide a "fair opportu-
nity" for property owners to avoid application of the regulations. In
Keystone, for example, the Subsidence Act specifically ignored the pri-
vate ordering of the right of support. The State of Pennsylvania in-
stead chose to appropriate by decree the power to control the surface
support of certain tracts of mineral-laden land. So we still have to ask
ourselves which Justice Stevens we believe-the pro-regulation, "po-
lice power hawk" in Keystone, or the champion of property rights,
against both grand and petty governmental larceny, in Hodel.
C. First English
Less than one month after Hodel, the Court decided what is certain
to be a landmark case in the law of takings. This case, First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,45 concerned a
church whose summer camp for handicapped children had been de-
stroyed by a flood. Subsequently, the County of Los Angeles enacted a
flood control ordinance that prohibited the construction of any build-
ing or structure on the property.46 The trial court held that, under
California law, a landowner may not maintain an inverse condemna-
tion action to recover just compensation in a regulatory takings case.4 7
Therefore, it granted a motion to strike the church's inverse condem-
nation claim. 48
The Supreme Court held that once it is determined a regulatory
44. Hodel v. Irving, 107 S. Ct. 2076, 2089 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring).
45. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
46. Id. at 2381-82.
47. Id. at 2382 (citing Agins v. Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372
(1979), aff'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980)).
48. Id. The trial court concluded that "compensation is not required until the chal-
lenged regulation or ordinance has been held excessive in an action for declara-
tory relief or a writ of mandamus and the government has nevertheless decided
to continue the regulation in effect." Id.
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scheme effects a taking, "no subsequent action by the government can
relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during
which the taking was effective." 49 In other words, the state cannot
avoid its duty to pay compensation for the period during which the
taking was effective by repealing or abandoning the regulation.
This holding is significant, because it raises the stakes for regula-
tors in what some commentators have referred to as the "zoning
game." If a regulation goes "too far," and thus effects a taking, it is no
longer sufficient for the government to merely apologize and abandon
the confiscatory regulation. Damages must be paid for the "temporary
taking," and, at least when major real estate developments are con-
cerned, these temporary damages can be significant.
Suppose, for example, that a local government zones Blackacre for
single-family use only; however, the owner of Blackacre wishes to use
the property for commercial purposes. The landowner challenges the
restriction, and, after spending several years pursuing his claim before
administrative bodies and in the courts, he establishes that the regula-
tion is unconstitutional. May the local government merely repeal the
regulation, or must it compensate the property owner for the tempo-
rary taking? Note that without a compensation remedy the property
owner is at the mercy of the regulators. In a recent book, two com-
mentators described the situation this way: "One common practice, if
the municipality lost the decision, was to rezone the property... and
in effect invite [the property owner] to bring another lawsuit. If, for
example, the plaintiff wanted ... [commercial zoning] for property
zoned single-family (R-1), the municipality would reclassify the land
to duplex (R-2)."50 As still another commentator has observed, this
game can continue for many years "until the property owner exhausts
his patience, his sanity, his wealth, his time on earth, or all four."5 1
First English established that the game is changing and the free
lunch has ended for regulators. Now, when a regulation effects a tak-
ing, just compensation must be paid for the period during which the
taking was in effect.
This case is significant for a number of other reasons. First, it pro-
vides further evidence, following Hodel, that the distinction between
physical takings and regulatory takings is eroding. For example,
when seeking guidance on the question whether temporary regulatory
takings require compensation, the First English majority looked to
cases in which the government had physically appropriated property
49. Id. at 2389.
50. R BABCOCK & C. SIEMON, THE ZONING GAME REVISITED 288 n.4 (1985).
51. Berger & Kanner, Thoughts on The White River Junction Manifesto: A Reply To
The "Gang of Five's" Views On Just Compensation For Regulatory Taking of
Property, 19 LOYOLA OF L.A.L. REv. 685, 734 (1986).
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for some temporary period of time.52 Moreover, as Justice Stevens
pointed out in his dissent, a straightforward application of the diminu-
tion in value test for regulatory takings would consider the duration of
the taking as only one factor in the analysis of whether the regulation
has gone "too far." The majority rejected this restrictive approach in
favor of a per se rule-once it is determined that the restrictions on
use go too far, and thus constitute a taking, the government may not
relieve itself of the obligation to provide compensation by withdraw-
ing the regulation. Second, the decision probably signals the end of
the road for land use moratoria because almost by definition the typi-
cal moratorium would appear to constitute a temporary taking.5 3
A third significant point concerning the potential impact of First
English is that it is certain to alter the dialogue between regulators
and property owners. Government officials will be reluctant to reach
too far when regulating property because of the potential liability for
temporary takings established by First English. Perhaps a spokesman
for the National Association of Home Builders summed it up best
when he said: "It's a terrific decision. This will have a deterrent effect
on those governments that know they're going too far. They're going
to be more careful now about enacting draconian land use
regulations."5 4
D. Nollan
Less than three weeks after First English, the other shoe fell with
the Supreme Court's decision in Nollan v. California Coastal Commis-
sion.5 5 James and Marilyn Nollan were owners of a small, beachfront
lot in Ventura County, California. Their journey to the Supreme
Court began when they applied to the California Coastal Commission
for a coastal development permit that would allow them to demolish a
small, run down bungalow, and replace it with a modern, three bed-
room home. The Commission sought to impose an exaction on ap-
proval of the permit. This exaction would allow the Nollans to build
their dream house subject to the condition that they grant and record
an easement for a public right-of-way across their private beach. This
52. "In considering this question, we find substantial guidance in cases where the
government has only temporarily exercised its right to use private property."
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct.
2378, 2387 (1987).
53. See R. BEST, NEW CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS FOR LAND USE REGULATION:
PORTENTS OF NOLLAN AND FIRST ENGLISH CHURCH 11-12 (1987). This paper is
available from the Pacific Legal Foundation, a public interest law firm which par-
ticipated in First English as an amicus curiae.
54. Top Court Deals Blow to Limits on Land Use, Chicago Sun Times, June 10, 1987,
at 12, quoted in, Peterson, Land Use Regulatory "Takings" Revisited The New
Supreme Court Approaches, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 335, 337 (1988).
55. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
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easement would allow the public lateral access between two public
beaches, one of which was located to the north and the other to the
south of the Nollans' private beach.
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, found this to be a taking, and
invalidated the right-of-way exaction. Justice Scalia wrote a very
strong majority opinion in which he criticized the Commission's
scheme as effecting "an out-and-out plan of extortion."5 6 Moreover,
he clearly recognized that the development of private property is a
right belonging to landowners, not a privilege or benefit granted by
government.57 Truly, a long neglected liberty has found a powerful
new champion in Justice Scalia.
Significantly, the Nollan Court appears to have adopted a height-
ened level of scrutiny for land use regulations challenged under the
takings clause.
As discussed earlier, the Court has, for quite some time, applied a
minimal (or even a sub-minimal) standard of review in regulatory tak-
ings cases. Under that prior standard, the regulation was upheld so
long as: 1) it reasonably advanced some arguable police power inter-
est; and 2) it did not totally eliminate the primary economic value of
the property.58 Nol=an dealt with the first of these requirements-the
required connection between the ends and the means of the regula-
tion. For example, the end or purpose sought to be advanced in Nol-
Ian was protection of the public's asserted right of "visual access" to
the beach. The means employed to further this purpose was the exac-
tion of a right-of-way easement over the Nollans' private beach.
Justice Scalia carefully examined the relationship between the
ends and the means of the challenged regulation, and held that the
means, the right-of-way exaction, did not substantially advance the
ends of protecting visual access to the beach. He explained his conclu-
sion as follows: "It is quite impossible to understand how a require-
ment that people already on the public beaches be able to walk across
the Nollans' property reduces any obstacles to viewing the beach cre-
ated by the new house." 59 Thus, even though the easement did not
greatly diminish the value of the Nollans' land, it could not be taken
without compensation.
56. Id. at 3148.
57. Id. at 3146 n.2. NoZlan thus presents a public analogy to the private law doctrine
of duress of goods. Seen in this light, the choice imposed upon the Nollans by the
Coastal Commission ("you may develop your property, so long as you grant us an
easement for lateral access") is a close substitute for the choice given a robbery
victim by a mugger who at gunpoint says "you may keep your diamond ring, if
you agree to give me your money." See Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrec-
tion, 1987 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 40. As such, Nollan is "a case of coercion and not of
trade." Id.
58. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
59. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3149 (1987).
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Moreover, Justice Scalia made it a point to warn regulators that
the new standard was a substantive one that could not easily be cir-
cumvented by more skillful drafting of regulations. He put it this way:
"We view the Fifth Amendment's property clause to be more than a
pleading requirement, and compliance with it to be more than an ex-
ercise in cleverness and imagination."60
Regrettably, the majority opinion did not provide a precise descrip-
tion of the new standard. In fact, the change seems to be more one of
commitment than of language; the Nollan Court breathed new life
and meaning into the long articulated standard that a land use regula-
tion must substantially advance some legitimate state interest.61
As I read Justice Scalia's opinion, the Supreme Court has decided
to take the fifth amendment seriously, and stop serving as a rubber
stamp for land use restrictions. It is no longer sufficient for regulators
to lip sync the words "health and safety" when restricting private
property. The Court is now willing to scrutinize property regulations
to insure that, to borrow a phrase from Justice Brennan's dissenting
opinion, there is a "precise fit" between the regulation and the harm
against which the regulation is directed.62 This is judicial activism as
it was meant to be. The Court did not manufacture new constitutional
liberties, it simply upheld its oath to vigorously enforce rights ex-
pressly embodied within the four corners of the Constitution.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, allow me to repeat the question posed at the begin-
ning of this commentary. Have the 1987 takings cases restored some
bite to the fifth amendment's protection of private property? To con-
tinue the metaphor, let me put the answer this way. The Supreme
Court has removed the dentures from the cup and has put them back
on. However, it is too early to tell whether the Court is willing to do
more than nibble at the edges of the regulatory state.
I had hoped that the Court would use a recent challenge to San
Jose's rent control ordinance as an opportunity to shed further light
on its new approach to the takings clause. That case, Pennell v. City of
San Jose,63 concerned a rent control ordinance under which a landlord
is automatically entitled to an annual rent increase of as much as eight
percent; however, a hearing is required if the landlord wishes to in-
60. Id. at 3150.
61. See id. at 3146. Professor Epstein suggests that the Nollan Court "has abandoned
the 'rational basis' test of prior land use cases... in favor of a standard demand-
ing intermediate scrutiny of government restrictions." Epstein, supra note 57, at
38.
62. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3153 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
63. 108 S. Ct. 849 (1988).
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crease the rent by more than eight percent and the tenant objects. At
the hearing, the hearing officer is required to consider whether the
proposed increase would cause "an unreasonably severe financial or
economic hardship on a particular tenant."6 4 The Court held that a
facial attack on the hardship provision under the takings clause was
"premature" because there was no evidence that the provision had
ever been applied to reduce a proposed rent increase. 65
Thus, the Court ducked the merits and, once again, demonstrated
its determination to deal with takings challenges on a case by case, "as
applied" basis. However, Pennell is significant in at least one respect.
Justice Scalia wrote a scathing dissent in which he reached the merits,
and concluded that the tenant hardship provision was an unconstitu-
tional attempt "to establish a welfare program privately funded by
those landlords who happen to have 'hardship' tenants."66
So what do the 1987 takings cases teach us about the current status
of the law of takings in the Supreme Court?
We know from Hodel and First English that the distinction be-
tween physical takings and regulatory takings is beginning to erode.
However, we do not know whether the Court will adopt the logical
conclusion that the "too far" test is unsupportable and that even small
regulatory takings are caught by the takings clause.
We know from First English that once it is determined that a regu-
lation effects an unconstitutional taking just compensation must be
paid for the period during which the regulation was in effect. There-
fore, government may not relieve itself of the obligation to provide
compensation for a temporary taking by withdrawing the regulation.
We know from Nollan that the Supreme Court clearly recognizes
that the development of land is an intrinsic right of ownership, not a
privilege or benefit which may be granted or withheld at the whim of
government. We also know from Nollan that the Court appears to
have adopted a heightened standard of review in regulatory exaction
cases. However, we do not have a clear picture of the substantive
terms of the new standard. Nor do we know whether it will be applied
generally in regulatory takings cases.
We know that Justice Scalia has emerged as a forceful champion of
economic civil rights, but we do not know whether he will be able to
build a lasting consensus on the Court around these issues.
Perhaps the practical significance of the 1987 takings cases was best
summed up by Robert K. Best, a lawyer who heads up Property Rights
Litigation for the Pacific Legal Foundation, and who was involved in
both the Nollan and First English litigation. Mr. Best said that
64. Id. at 854.
65. Id. at 856.
66. Id. at 863 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
1988]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
although the practical ramifications of these cases will depend upon
future developments in the courts, one thing is clear. The terms of the
debate have changed. In early 1987, the question was: "How much
further can government go in restricting property use and forcing
property owners to fund community programs?" Following the 1987
Supreme Court cases, however, the debate has shifted its focus, and
the question has become: How far must government retreat from the
"excessive conduct of the past?"67
As for me, I like the new debate much more than I did the old.
67. See R. BEST, supra note 53, at 2. On March 15, 1988, President Reagan issued an
executive order calling on federal departments and agencies to comply with the
recent Supreme Court takings cases. Executive Order 12,630 calls on government
officials to "be sensitive to, anticipate, and account for, the obligations imposed by
the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment in planning and carrying
out governmental actions." Exec. Order No. 12,630, 53 Fed. Reg. 8,859 (1988). A
recent New York case construed First English and Nollan, and concluded that a
New York City law regulating buildings containing single-room occupancy units
violated the takings clause. See Seawall Associates v. City of New York, 138 Misc.
2d 96, 523 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1987).
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